The classical network configuration introduced by Braess in 1968 is of fundamental significance because Valiant and Roughgarden showed in 2006 that 'the "global" behaviour of an equilibrium flow in a large random network is similar to that in Braess' original four-node example'. In this paper, a natural generalisation of Braess' network is introduced and conditions for the occurrence of Braess' paradox are formulated for the generalised network.
Introduction
The traffic network can be generally described as a game, where a finite number of interdependent network users compete with each other by making simultaneous decisions route choices. It is commonly assumed that network users non-cooperatively interact with each other in the traffic network in order to minimize their travel costs. This problem can be modelled as an N -person nonzero-sum game (see [6] ). Its solution assumes the existence of equilibrium. The concept of equilibrium in the context of transport systems had appeared in the 1950s ( [2, 13] ) and is based on the general assumption that network users are making adjustments to their travel choices until a state of equilibrium is reached, i.e when no individual can make a further improvement as a result of any individual choice. A specific situation investigated in this work is the effect of introducing a new link to a congested traffic network, and the likelihood of this additional capacity to improve the system's performance (measured by users' aggregated cost or travel time). The addition of a link to an existing transport system may lead to undesired situations.
The well-known Braess' paradox [3] describes situations when adding a new link to a transport network might not reduce congestion in the network but instead increase it. This is due to individual entities acting selfishly/separately when making their travel plan choices and hence forcing the system as a whole not to operate optimally. Deeper insight into this paradox from the viewpoint of the structure and characteristics of networks may help transport planners to avoid the occurrence of Braess-like situations in real-life networks. The same paradox also applies to situations when an existing link is removed from a network. The famous example is the closing 
where α ij ≥ 0 is the free flow travel time for the link (i, j), β ij > 0 is the delay parameter for (i, j), and f ij ≥ 0 is the flow on the link (i, j). A fixed traffic coming from outside the network is allowed. For example, in Figure 2 the dashed arrows represent a fixed trafficf coming to the network and then going outside.
The assumption of a linear relationship between traffic volume on a link and the travel time on it (so-called 'volume-delay function') is common in the context of Braess' paradox. Although there is evidence to support such a linear approximation [12] , many different types of volume-delay functions, e.g. BPR functions [5] , have been applied (see [4] for a review article). However, the investigation of the non-linear case is not in the scope of this work. Suppose we want to decide whether Braess' paradox occurs when removing a link on the path going from b to c. If a particular link (i, j) has a fixed flowf coming from outside the network, i.e. not the internal flow f going from a to d through this link, then its travel time function can be written as follows:
The updated function depends on the internal flow and it is linear, because the external flowf is fixed and henceα ij is a fixed number. Thus, the first step is to update all travel time functions taking into accounts external flows. Further, it is easy to see that the total travel time functions for the above paths are linear functions, since the travel time functions for links are linear and all the links belonging to one of the paths share the same internal flow. For instance, if such a path P with an internal flow f consists of two links (i, j) and (j, k), then the total travel time function is as follows:
Thus, if all the above paths are replaced by single links, then we obtain Braess' network with arbitrary linear travel time functions (see Figure 2 ):
α 4 + β 4 f ac for link (a, c);
Note that in Braess' original example [3] and in many of the studies that followed it (e.g. [6] ), the network is symmetric, i.e the time functions for the links (a,b) and (c,d) are same as well as the time functions for the links (b,d) and (a,c), and the free flow travel times for the links (a, b) and (c, d) are equal to zero. The occurrence of Braess' paradox in this symmetrical network configuration was described by Pas and Principio [8] (see Corollary 1) .
In this paper, we consider a more general situation with arbitrary linear time functions. The existence of Braess' paradox in such a network can be decided by using Theorems 1-4, where the network N is N + with the link (b, c) removed.
Let Q > 0 denote the total flow in N/N + , i.e Q = f ab + f ac = f bd + f cd . Note that f ij and Q are not necessarily integer numbers. Let us denote
e.g. α 12 means α 1 + α 2 , and β ij is defined similarly. Also,
The following equality will be used throughout the paper:
Further, we introduce the Braess numbers B i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4: Also, two parameters µ 1 and µ 2 are defined as follows:
3. Equilibria in N and N + It is well known that a user equilibrium always exists, and in a network without capacities, it is essentially unique (e.g. see [9] ).
A network with one source and one sink is said to be at equilibrium if (a) The travel time on paths with non-vanishing flow is the same, and it is denoted by T Eq , and (b) The travel time on paths with no flow is at least T Eq .
The equilibrium described above is associated with aggregated strategic behaviour of all road users, described as an N -person Wardrop/Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, no user can decrease his/her route travel time by unilaterally switching routes [13] . In other words, if a network is not at equilibrium, then some users of the network (e.g. drivers) can switch their routes in order to improve their travel time. However, if a driver decides to switch to a better route, then the travel time for this route increases, and, after a certain period of time, it will become impossible to improve drivers' travel times by switching the routes. Thus, the equilibrium describes 'stable state' behaviour in a network, and no driver has any incentive to switch routes at equilibrium because it will not improve their current travel times.
The following lemma describes the equilibrium in the network N , which is N + with the link (b, c) removed. Note that in Lemma 1 the case (a) corresponds to the situation when the path P 1 has a vanishing flow and P 2 has a non-vanishing flow in N . In case (b) the path P 1 has a non-vanishing flow and P 2 has a vanishing flow, and in case (c) no path has a vanishing flow. Also, the cases (a) and (b) in this lemma are mutually exclusive because one of the numbers −α/β 45 and α/β 12 is negative, or they both are equal to zero. Lemma 1. In the network N , the travel time at equilibrium is as follows:
Proof: Let us denote f ab by h. Then f bd = h and f ac = f cd = Q − h. We have
where T i is the travel time on the path P i .
Case (a): Suppose that P 1 has a vanishing flow and P 2 has a non-vanishing flow. Then Q > h = 0 and T 1 = α 12 and T 2 = α 45 + Qβ 45 .
At equilibrium, T 1 ≥ T 2 , i.e. α 12 ≥ α 45 + Qβ 45 or Q ≤ −α/β 45 . The travel time at equilibrium is
Case (b): Assume that P 1 has a non-vanishing flow and P 2 has a vanishing flow. We have Q = h > 0 and
The travel time at equilibrium is as follows:
Case (c): Suppose that no path has a vanishing flow. We have Q > h > 0. At equilibrium,
Therefore, the condition Q > h > 0 is equivalent to
Finally,
The equilibrium in N + is described by seven cases in Lemma 2. It may be pointed out that these cases correspond to the following situations in N + : (a) the only path with non-vanishing flow is P 3 ; (b) the only path with non-vanishing flow is P 2 ; (c) the only path with non-vanishing flow is P 1 ; (d) the only path with vanishing flow is P 1 ; (e) the only path with vanishing flow is P 2 ; (f) the only path with vanishing flow is P 3 ; (g) no path has a vanishing flow.
Also, it is not difficult to see that some of the cases in Lemma 2 are mutually exclusive, so the equilibrium in a particular network N + is described by some of the the presented seven cases. For example, if α i = β i = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, then the equilibrium is given by just one case (f).
Lemma 2. In the network N + , the travel time at equilibrium is as follows:
Proof: Let us denote f ab by f , and f bc by g. Then f ac = Q − f and, using the conservation-offlow constraints, f bd = f − g and f cd = Q − f + g (see Figure 3 ). We have
where T i is the travel time on the path P i . Figure 3 . The link flows in N + .
Case (a):
The only path with non-vanishing flow is P 3 , i.e. P 1 and P 2 have a vanishing flow. Therefore, Q = f = g > 0 and
At equilibrium, T 1 ≥ T 3 and T 2 ≥ T 3 , i.e. 
Case (b):
The only path with non-vanishing flow is P 2 . Hence Q > f = g = 0 and
At equilibrium, T 1 ≥ T 2 and T 3 ≥ T 2 , i.e.
Case (c):
The only path with non-vanishing flow is P 1 . Hence Q = f > g = 0 and
At equilibrium, T 2 ≥ T 1 and T 3 ≥ T 1 , i.e.
Case (d):
The only path with vanishing flow is P 1 . We obtain Q > f = g > 0 and
At equilibrium, T 2 = T 3 and T 1 ≥ T 2 , i.e.
Note that β 45 β 134 − β 4 β 14 = β 3 β 45 + β 5 β 14 and, usingᾱ = α +α,
Hence Q ≤α β 14 − αβ 3 β 3 β 45 + β 5 β 14 ,
i.e. Q ≤ µ 1 . Now, taking into account that Q > f > 0, the following is obtained:
which is equivalent to Q > max{ᾱ/β 13 ; −ᾱ/β 4 }.
Case (e): The only path with vanishing flow is P 2 . We obtain Q = f > g > 0 and
At equilibrium, T 1 = T 3 and T 2 ≥ T 3 , i.e.
Now, rearranging the left-hand side, and usingα =ᾱ − α, we obtain
Thus, Q ≤ µ 2 . Taking into account that Q > g > 0, we obtain
which is equivalent to Q > max{α/β 35 ; −α/β 2 }.
Case (f ): The only path with vanishing flow is P 3 . We obtain Q > f > g = 0 and
At equilibrium, T 1 = T 2 and T 3 ≥ T 2 , i.e.
It is not difficult to see that Q(β 14 β 45 − ββ 4 ) = QB 1 and, using α =ᾱ −α,
Thus,
Taking into account that Q > f > 0, we obtain
which is equivalent to Q > max{α/β 12 ; −α/β 45 }.
Case (g):
No path has a vanishing flow, and so Q > f > g > 0. At equilibrium, T 1 = T 2 and
It is easy to see that β 45 β 14 − β 4 β = B 1 , so
The condition g > 0 is equivalent toᾱβ − αβ 14 − QB 1 > 0 or QB 1 <ᾱβ − αβ 14 . Using (2), we obtain B 1 <α β 14 +ᾱβ 25 Q .
The condition f > g can be written as (α + gβ 25 + Qβ 45 )/β > g or g < (α + Qβ 45 )/β 14 . Hencē
which is equivalent to
It is easy to see that B 1 β 14 + β 45 β 25 β 14 = β 5 β 14 β and β 2 14 + β 3 β + β 25 β 14 = β 134 β. Therefore, Q(β 3 β 45 β + β 5 β 14 β) >ᾱβ 14 β − αβ 134 β or Q(β 3 β 45 + β 5 β 14 ) >ᾱβ 14 − αβ 134 .
Using (1), we obtain Q > µ 1 . Now let us consider the condition Q > f , which can be written as Q > (α + gβ 25 + Qβ 45 )/β or (Qβ 12 − α)/β 25 > g. Hence 
It is easy to see that β 25 β 12 /β − β 2 = B 1 /β, and so In the following theorems, we formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the paradox for all the cases of Mega-Theorem. These theorems are proved in Section 6. 
Moreover, Theorems 3 and 4 are mutually exclusive in the sense that they cannot provide intervals for Q simultaneously. This is true because the inequalitiesᾱ/β 13 < µ 1 andα/β 35 < µ 2 are inconsistent. Note also that if, for example, Theorems 1-3 provide non-empty intervals for Q, then the interval with highest values of Q is given by Theorem 1, the interval with smallest values of Q is provided by Theorem 2, and Theorem 3 yields the interval with mid-range values of Q.
Note that the original assumption β i > 0 for all i can be relaxed by allowing β i = 0 for some i. This can be done by introducing +∞ and −∞ when a non-zero number is divided by zero. For example, let us consider Arnott-Small's example [1] :
We obtain α = 0,ᾱ =α = 7.5, β = 0.02, B 1 = 10 −4 , µ 1 = µ 2 = 750.
By Theorems 1 and 2, Braess' paradox occurs if 500 < Q < 1500, while Theorems 3 and 4 provide no intervals for Q. In calculating the lower bounds for Q in these theorems we have division by zero, but this problem is overcome by putting −7.5/0 = −∞.
Symmetrical/Asymmetrical Networks and the Pseudo-Paradox
Let us consider the classical case of a symmetrical network presented by Braess [3] and discussed in Pas and Principio [8] and other papers. Using our notation, it is a particular case of the network configuration N/N + when time functions are symmetrical for links that do not share nodes with each other ((a, b) and (c, d), (a, c) and (b, d) ), the free flow travel times for the links (a, b) and (c, d) are equal to zero, and the delay parameter for (b, c) is equal to the delay parameter of the links (b, d) and (a, c), i.e.
Also, it is assumed that α 2 > α 3 and β 1 > β 2 . This network configuration is denoted by M/M + (see Figure 4) . 
Proof: For the network configuration M/M + , we have
The Braess number B 1 is positive because β 1 > β 2 in M/M + . Under the conditions of Theorem 1, Braess' paradox occurs if
, which is a positive number. Therefore, by Theorem 2,
Note that the lower bound is less than the upper bound because β 1 > β 2 . Thus, the above inequalities can be written together as
The upper and lower bounds of Theorems 3 and 4 provide no intervals for Q.
Now letM /M + denote the above network configuration M/M + without the assumption that α 2 > α 3 and β 1 > β 2 . A proof similar to that of Corollary 1 shows that Braess' paradox occurs inM /M + in the following cases only:
(a) If β 1 > β 2 and
The both cases imply that α 2 > α 3 . Another implicit relationship is obtained from (b) if we require that 2(α 2 − α 3 )
which is equivalent to β 1 > β 2 . Thus, even though the network configurationM /M + extends M/M + , the conditions for the occurrence of Braess' paradox are the same. Let us further extend the network configurationM /M + by allowing any non-negative free flow travel time α 1 for the links (a, b) and (c, d) and any positive delay parameter β 3 for the link (b, c). In other words, the symmetrical network configuration S/S + of Figure 5 is obtained from N/N + when time functions are symmetrical for links that do not share nodes with each other: 
Proof: For the network configuration S/S + , we have
By Theorem 1, Braess' paradox occurs if B 1 is positive, i.e. β 1 > β 2 , and
Now, B 2 = β 131 2β 12 − β 2 12 = β 12 (3β 1 + 2β 3 − β 2 ). Therefore, by Theorem 2, Braess' paradox occurs if 3β 1 + 2β 3 > β 2 and 2(α 2 − α 13 )
This implies that α 2 > α 13 . Also, it is easy to see that the lower bound is less than the upper bound only if β 1 > β 2 , which is stronger than 3β 1 + 2β 3 > β 2 . Thus, the above inequalities can be written together as 2(α 2 − α 13 )
In Corollary 2 there is an implicit assumption that α 2 > α 13 because Q is a positive number (if α 2 ≤ α 13 , then (3) provides no interval for Q). We will see in Corollary 6 what is happening with the times at equilibria in S/S + if Q exceeds the upper bound in (3), where α 2 > α 13 and Figure 6 . The asymmetric network A + .
The asymmetrical network configuration A/A + of Figure 6 is obtained from N/N + when time functions are same for links that share the origin and the destination:
Corollary 3. Braess' paradox cannot occur in the asymmetrical network configuration A/A + .
Proof: For the network configuration A/A + , we have
It is easy to see that Theorems 1-4 provide no intervals, so Braess' paradox is impossible.
Using Lemmas 1 and 2 we see that the equilibria in A/A + are described by the cases (c) and (f), respectively, i.e. in A no path has a vanishing flow, and in A + the only path with vanishing flow is P 3 . Also, the flow Q is distributed evenly between P 1 and P 2 and
Thus, the travel times at equilibria in A and A + are equal for any Q. This observation is important because adding a new link to A does not improve the general performance, even though Braess' paradox is not occurring.
We say that the pseudo-paradox occurs in the network configuration N/N + if
for an interval of values for Q (as opposite to a single point). In other words, we exclude single values of Q when going from the situation "Braess' paradox does not occur" to "Braess' paradox occurs". Thus, the pseudo-paradox describes a situation when adding a new link to a network does not change the general performance for a range of values of the total flow. As seen above, the pseudo-paradox occurs in the asymmetrical network configuration A/A + for any Q > 0. In our view, the pseudo-paradox is a more common phenomenon than Braess' paradox. Corollary 6. Suppose that Braess' paradox occurs in the symmetrical network configuration S/S + , i.e. β 1 > β 2 and α 2 > α 13 . Then S/S + is experiencing the pseudo-paradox for any
Proof: We know that α = 0,ᾱ =α = α 2 − α 13 and B 1 = β 12 (β 1 − β 2 ) > 0. Therefore, the second inequality in Corollary 4 (c) is equivalent to
as required.
Thus, under the conditions of Corollary 6, some improvement in S/S + is only possible if Q is less than the lower bound in (3), followed by Braess' paradox until Q reaches the upper bound in (3), followed by the pseudo-paradox for larger values of Q.
We conclude this section with a numerical example. Let the network configuration N/N + have the following parameters: 
Proof of the Theorems
We will consider the cases (i,j), where (i) is one of the cases of Lemma 1, and (j) is one of the cases of Lemma 2. First of all, suppose that at equilibrium the path P 3 has a vanishing flow in N + , i.e. the flow at equilibrium may only use P 1 and P 2 , or just one of those paths. It is easy to see that the same flow is an equilibrium flow in N , and the travel times at equilibria are equal. Let us first assume thatα ≥ 0. We have Q ≤ −α/β 45 from (a) and Q >α/β 35 from (e). Henceα/β 35 < −α/β 45 orα β 45 + αβ 35 < 0.
From (e), we obtainα
Usingᾱ = α +α, the above inequality is equivalent tô α(β 1 β 25 + β 3 β 12 − β 25 β 35 ) − αβ 35 β 235 < 0.
Since
Adding (4) and (5), we obtainαβ 14 < 0, contrary to the assumptionα ≥ 0. Now suppose thatα < 0. We have Q ≤ −α/β 45 from (a) and Q > −α/β 2 from (e). Hence −α/β 2 < −α/β 45 orα β 45 − αβ 2 > 0.
From (e), we obtain −α β 2 <ᾱ β 25 + αβ 3 β 1 β 25 + β 3 β 12 .
Hence, usingᾱ = α +α,α
It is easy to see that β 1 β 25 + β 3 β 12 + β 2 β 25 = β 12 β 235 , sô
Adding (6) and (7), we obtainαβ > 0, a contradiction.
Case (a,g): We will show that the upper and lower bounds imposed on Q in this case are inconsistent. We have µ 1 < Q ≤ −α/β 45 , i.e.
Also, from (g), QB 1 <αβ 14 +ᾱβ 25 .
Suppose that B 1 = 0, i.e.
and 0 <αβ 14 +ᾱβ 25 .
From (10), we obtain β 1 = β 2 β 4 /β 5 , β 2 = β 1 β 5 /β 4 and β 1 /β 4 = β 2 /β 5 . Therefore,
Thus,αβ 4 +ᾱβ 5 > 0. Now 0 <αβ 4 +ᾱβ 5 =αβ 4 + (α +α)β 5 =αβ 45 + αβ 5 , contrary to (8) . Usingᾱ = α +α, we can re-write (9) in the following form:
Assume now that B 1 < 0, i.e. Since Q > µ 1 , we obtainα
where L = β 3 β 45 + β 5 β 14 . The last inequality is equivalent tô
It is easy to see that βL − β 14 B 1 = β 45 (ββ 3 + β 14 β 25 ) and
Thus,α β 45 + αβ 5 > 0, contrary to (8) .
Case (b,a): Assume that T + Eq > T Eq , which implies Q(β 35 − β 2 ) >α. Since 0 < Q ≤α/β 35 , we obtainα > 0. Therefore, β 35 − β 2 > 0 and
contrary to Q ≤α/β 35 .
Case (b,d):
We will show that the upper and lower bounds imposed on Q in this case are inconsistent. Let us first assume thatᾱ ≥ 0. We have Q ≤ α/β 12 from (b) and Q >ᾱ/β 13 from (d). Hencē α/β 13 < α/β 12 orᾱ β 12 − αβ 13 < 0.
From (d,) we obtainᾱ
where L = β 3 β 45 + β 5 β 14 . Usingα =ᾱ − α, the above inequality is equivalent tō
Adding (11) and (12), we obtainᾱβ 25 < 0, contrary to the assumptionᾱ ≥ 0. Now suppose thatᾱ < 0. We have −ᾱ/β 4 < α/β 12 or
Adding (13) and (14), we obtainᾱβ > 0, contrary to the assumptionᾱ < 0.
Case (b,e): T + Eq > T Eq impliesα + Qβ 2 < 0, i.e. Q < −α/β 2 , but Q > −α/β 2 in the case (e). Case (b,g): We will show that the upper and lower bounds imposed on Q in this case are inconsistent. We have µ 2 < Q ≤ α/β 12 , i.e.
From (g), we have QB 1 <αβ 14 +ᾱβ 25 .
From (17), we obtain β 4 = β 1 β 5 /β 2 , β 5 = β 2 β 4 /β 1 and β 4 /β 1 = β 5 /β 2 . Therefore,
Thus,αβ 1 +ᾱβ 2 > 0, contrary to (15). Assume now that B 1 < 0, i.e.
Q >α β 14 +ᾱβ 25 B 1 . Using α =ᾱ −α, the last inequality can be re-written as follows:
where
It is not difficult to see that X = β 1 (β 14 β 25 + β 3 β) and Y = β 2 (β 14 β 25 + β 3 β).
Thus, (18) From the proof of Lemma 2 we know that g > 0. Hence B 1 > 0. Therefore, the last inequality in the case (g) can be written as Q <α β 14 +ᾱβ 25 B 1 .
In addition, we have max α β 12 ; −α β 45 ; µ 1 ; µ 2 < Q.
Conclusions and Further Research
Braess' paradox has been investigated in symmetric four-link networks by a number of authors. This paper provides a generalisation of Pas and Principio's findings [8] to non-symmetric networks and shows, for a given congested network, that Braess' paradox occurs if and only if the total demand of travel (Q) lies between a certain range of values. The motivation for such an extension was given by Pas and Principio in their conclusions in [8] . Also, in the context of volume-delay functions and their parameters, it can be argued that symmetry properties of networks are not very common in real-life situations.
A further research direction is to generalise results presented in [8] and this work, and find the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Braess' paradox with arbitrary travel times of links in networks with complex topology. Further extensions of this work might also include the investigation of additional network features that were not illustrated in the classical problem introduced by Braess and his colleagues [3] . Of specific relevance to transport researchers is the study of networks in which volume-delay functions are not linear in their parameters. Another future direction suggested by Pas and Principio [8] would be the investigation of Braess' paradox in situations where the overall demand (Q) for travel is not constant (i.e. inelastic).
